Fabio Tollon

Fabio Tollon is a doctoral candidate in philosophy of science at Bielefeld University. He believes that the development of AI will fundamentally change our moral landscape, both in terms of the number of action schemes available to us, and the potential implications of our actions. It is therefore essential that we have a robust meta-ethical grounding in our approach to the ethics of AI. Without rigorous conceptual apparatus we will be lost in our ethical analysis of these emergent and ubiquitous artificial systems. Fabio is currently part of the research training group GRK 2073 "Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research", funded by the German Research Foundation. His research focuses on the potential for artificial systems to be moral agents and/or moral patients, and what this could mean for scientists developing and using such systems. He has a BA PPE (politics, philosophy and economics), BA honours (philosophy), and an MA (philosophy), all from Stellenbosch University.

TALKS:
1) 'Toward a Coherent Account of Moral Agency' (FAIR 2019);
2) 'Functional Moral Agency' (4IR: Philosophical, Ethical and Legal Perspectives 2019).

PUBLICATIONS:
1) Tollon, Fabio. 2020. The Artificial View: toward a non-anthropocentric account of moral patiency. Ethics and Information Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09540-4;
2) Tollon, Fabio. 2019. Moral Agents or Mindless Machines? A critical appraisal of agency in artificial systems. Hungarian Philosophical Review 63(4), pp. 9-23;
3) Tollon, Fabio. 2019. Toward a Coherent Account of Moral Agency. Proceedings of the South African Forum for Artificial Intelligence Research. Vol 2540. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2540/.

Publications

2022

Tollon, F. . (2022). Responsibility gaps and the reactive attitudes. AI and Ethics. http://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00172-6

Abstract BibTex Entry BibTeX Download PDF

Tollon2022_Article_ResponsibilityGapsAndTheReacti.pdf

Artifcial Intelligence (AI) systems are ubiquitous. From social media timelines, video recommendations on YouTube, and the kinds of adverts we see online, AI, in a very real sense, flters the world we see. More than that, AI is being embedded in agent-like systems, which might prompt certain reactions from users. Specifcally, we might fnd ourselves feeling frustrated if these systems do not meet our expectations. In normal situations, this might be fne, but with the ever increasing sophistication of AI-systems, this might become a problem. While it seems unproblematic to realize that being angry at your car for breaking down is unfitting, can the same be said for AI-systems? In this paper, therefore, I will investigate the so-called “reactive attitudes”, and their important link to our responsibility practices. I then show how within this framework there exist exemption and excuse conditions, and test whether our adopting the “objective attitude” toward agential AI is justifed. I argue that such an attitude is appropriate in the context of three distinct senses of responsibility (answerability, attributability, and accountability), and that, therefore, AI-systems do not undermine our responsibility ascriptions.

@article{487,
  author = {Fabio Tollon},
  title = {Responsibility gaps and the reactive attitudes},
  abstract = {Artifcial Intelligence (AI) systems are ubiquitous. From social media timelines, video recommendations on YouTube, and the kinds of adverts we see online, AI, in a very real sense, flters the world we see. More than that, AI is being embedded in agent-like systems, which might prompt certain reactions from users. Specifcally, we might fnd ourselves feeling frustrated if these systems do not meet our expectations. In normal situations, this might be fne, but with the ever increasing sophistication of AI-systems, this might become a problem. While it seems unproblematic to realize that being angry at your car for breaking down is unfitting, can the same be said for AI-systems? In this paper, therefore, I will investigate the so-called “reactive attitudes”, and their important link to our responsibility practices. I then show how within this framework there exist exemption and excuse conditions, and test whether our adopting the “objective attitude” toward agential AI is justifed. I argue that such an attitude is appropriate in the context of three distinct senses of responsibility (answerability, attributability, and accountability), and that, therefore, AI-systems do not undermine our responsibility ascriptions.},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {AI and Ethics},
  publisher = {Springer},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43681-022-00172-6},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00172-6},
}

2021

Tollon, F. . (2021). Designed to Seduce: Epistemically Retrograde Ideation and YouTube’s Recommender System. International Journal of Technoethics (IJT), 12 (2). http://doi.org/10.4018/IJT.2021070105

Abstract BibTex Entry BibTeX Download

Up to 70% of all watch time on YouTube is due to the suggested content of its recommender system. This system has been found, by virtue of its design, to be promoting conspiratorial content. In this paper, the author firstly critiques the value neutrality thesis regarding technology, showing it to be philosophically untenable. This means that technological artefacts can influence what people come to value (or perhaps even embody values themselves) and change the moral evaluation of an action. Secondly, he introduces the concept of an affordance, borrowed from the literature on ecological psychology. This concept allows him to make salient how technologies come to solicit certain kinds of actions from users, making such actions more or less likely, and in this way influencing the kinds of things one comes to value. Thirdly, he critically assesses the results of a study by Alfano et al. He makes use of the literature on affordances, introduced earlier, to shed light on how these technological systems come to mediate our perception of the world and influence action.

@article{415,
  author = {Fabio Tollon},
  title = {Designed to Seduce: Epistemically Retrograde Ideation and YouTube&#039;s Recommender System},
  abstract = {Up to 70% of all watch time on YouTube is due to the suggested content of its recommender system. This system has been found, by virtue of its design, to be promoting conspiratorial content. In this paper, the author firstly critiques the value neutrality thesis regarding technology, showing it to be philosophically untenable. This means that technological artefacts can influence what people come to value (or perhaps even embody values themselves) and change the moral evaluation of an action. Secondly, he introduces the concept of an affordance, borrowed from the literature on ecological psychology. This concept allows him to make salient how technologies come to solicit certain kinds of actions from users, making such actions more or less likely, and in this way influencing the kinds of things one comes to value. Thirdly, he critically assesses the results of a study by Alfano et al. He makes use of the literature on affordances, introduced earlier, to shed light on how these technological systems come to mediate our perception of the world and influence action.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {International Journal of Technoethics (IJT)},
  volume = {12},
  issue = {2},
  publisher = {IGI Global},
  isbn = {9781799861492},
  url = {https://www.igi-global.com/gateway/article/281077},
  doi = {10.4018/IJT.2021070105},
}

Tollon, F. . (2021). Artifacts and affordances: from designed properties to possibilities for action. AI & SOCIETY Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Communication, 36(1). http://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01155-7

Abstract BibTex Entry BibTeX Download PDF

Tollon2021_Article_ArtifactsAndAffordances.pdf

In this paper I critically evaluate the value neutrality thesis regarding technology, and find it wanting. I then introduce the various ways in which artifacts can come to influence moral value, and our evaluation of moral situations and actions. Here, following van de Poel and Kroes, I introduce the idea of value sensitive design. Specifically, I show how by virtue of their designed properties, artifacts may come to embody values. Such accounts, however, have several shortcomings. In agreement with Michael Klenk, I raise epistemic and metaphysical issues with respect to designed properties embodying value. The concept of an affordance, borrowed from ecological psychology, provides a more philosophically fruitful grounding to the potential way(s) in which artifacts might embody values. This is due to the way in which it incorporates key insights from perception more generally, and how we go about determining possibilities for action in our environment specifically. The affordance account as it is presented by Klenk, however, is insufficient. I therefore argue that we understand affordances based on whether they are meaningful, and, secondly, that we grade them based on their force.

@article{386,
  author = {Fabio Tollon},
  title = {Artifacts and affordances: from designed properties to possibilities for action},
  abstract = {In this paper I critically evaluate the value neutrality thesis regarding technology, and find it wanting. I then introduce the various ways in which artifacts can come to influence moral value, and our evaluation of moral situations and actions. Here, following van de Poel and Kroes, I introduce the idea of value sensitive design. Specifically, I show how by virtue of their designed properties, artifacts may come to embody values. Such accounts, however, have several shortcomings. In agreement with Michael Klenk, I raise epistemic and metaphysical issues with respect to designed properties embodying value. The concept of an affordance, borrowed from ecological psychology, provides a more philosophically fruitful grounding to the potential way(s) in which artifacts might embody values. This is due to the way in which it incorporates key insights from perception more generally, and how we go about determining possibilities for action in our environment specifically. The affordance account as it is presented by Klenk, however, is insufficient. I therefore argue that we understand affordances based on whether they are meaningful, and, secondly, that we grade them based on their force.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {AI &amp; SOCIETY Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Communication},
  volume = {36},
  issue = {1},
  publisher = {Springer},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00146-021-01155-7},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01155-7},
}

2020

Tollon, F. . (2020). The artifcial view: toward a non‑anthropocentric account of moral patiency. Ethics and Information Technology, 22(4). http://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09540-4

Abstract BibTex Entry BibTeX Download PDF

Tollon2020_Article_TheArtificialViewTowardANon-an.pdf

In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of the Organic View of Ethical Status, as outlined by Torrance (2008). A key presupposition of this view is that only moral patients can be moral agents. It is claimed that because artificial agents lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern (i.e. moral patients). This account of moral standing in principle excludes machines from participating in our moral universe. I will argue that the Organic View operationalises anthropocentric intuitions regarding sentience ascription, and by extension how we identify moral patients. The main difference between the argument I provide here and traditional arguments surrounding moral attributability is that I do not necessarily defend the view that internal states ground our ascriptions of moral patiency. This is in contrast to views such as those defended by Singer (1975, 2011) and Torrance (2008), where concepts such as sentience play starring roles. I will raise both conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to this sense of sentience. While this does not preclude the usage of sentience outright, it suggests that we should be more careful in our usage of internal mental states to ground our moral ascriptions. Following from this I suggest other avenues for further exploration into machine moral patiency which may not have the same shortcomings as the Organic View.

@article{387,
  author = {Fabio Tollon},
  title = {The artifcial view: toward a non‑anthropocentric account of moral patiency},
  abstract = {In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of the Organic View of Ethical Status, as outlined by Torrance (2008). A key presupposition of this view is that only moral patients can be moral agents. It is claimed that because artificial agents lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern (i.e. moral patients). This account of moral standing in principle excludes machines from participating in our moral universe. I will argue that the Organic View operationalises anthropocentric intuitions regarding sentience ascription, and by extension how we identify moral patients. The main difference between the argument I provide here and traditional arguments surrounding moral attributability is that I do not necessarily defend the view that internal states ground our ascriptions of moral patiency. This is in contrast to views such as those defended by Singer (1975, 2011) and Torrance (2008), where concepts such as sentience play starring roles. I will raise both conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to this sense of sentience. While this does not preclude the usage of sentience outright, it suggests that we should be more careful in our usage of internal mental states to ground our moral ascriptions. Following from this I suggest other avenues for further exploration into machine moral patiency which may not have the same shortcomings as the Organic View.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
  volume = {22},
  issue = {4},
  publisher = {Springer},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10676-020-09540-4},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09540-4},
}